March 23, 2016
Updated: March 23, 2016 01:56 IST
The real problem of the U.S.’s executive, legislative and judicial control over ICANN and the root server will not change with a shift to what is effectively internal oversight
ICANN, or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, is
the U.S.-based body that runs the Internet’s central directory and
coordinates its key technical functions. There is a lot of buzz
currently around finalisation of the proposal for ICANN’s oversight
moving from the U.S. government to a multistakeholder group. Since this
group elects ICANN’s board of directors in the first place, it can be
said that ICANN will now be an independent organisation, with no
external oversight. This group, which prefers to call itself the
“multistakeholder ICANN community”, consists of some sub-groups each
with different technical governance roles, and different kinds of
openness to non-members.
This ‘community’ is essentially a few hundred people at the most, with
steep power gradations within it. There exists a strong in-group culture
and ideology, and various kinds of meritocracies. This has meant that
the group is dominated by the industry, which can pay for participants
of ‘high quality’, with staying power (for the endless email discussions
that could culminate in ‘decisions’), and who are well-versed in the
U.S. corporate lingo. Don’t expect to find words like democracy and
representation ever mentioned in this group. It is mostly U.S.-based
industry, overwhelming white men, some from Europe, plus, co-optation
of, largely, a few elite groups from other countries. ICANN’s board, its
real decision-making body, comes from this ‘community’, and now its
oversight is to be internalised within the same group.
Does it mean that nothing will change with the oversight transition?
Well, not exactly. It is an important step towards making ICANN a
genuinely global organisation. But only if it is indeed just the first
step, to be followed by more steps, which is not clear at present. To
understand the implications of this step, one must look at three things:
what changes, what does not change, and what may even change for the
worse.
If the proposal is accepted by the U.S. government, as is likely, what
would change is significant. Currently, ICANN is basically a contractor
carrying out some tasks, of which the substantive authority vests with
the U.S. government. The fact that the U.S. has not interfered with
these tasks in any major way does not means that its de jure
authority is not meaningful. The U.S. government will now be divested of
this authority, and ICANN will become an independent body in managing
its domain names-related policy work, and the Internet’s root zone file,
containing information about Internet names and numbers, addresses,
which are copied and replicated by other servers the world over.
What doesn’t change
More significant, at least for those outside the U.S., is what does not change. The main problem that non-U.S. actors have with the U.S. control over ICANN is that it can unilaterally interfere with the ICANN’s policy process, and the Internet’s root server (containing the authoritative root zone file). Post transition, it will no longer be able to do so with a direct fiat to ICANN. However, the numerous judicial, executive and legislative powers held by the U.S. government over ICANN as an American organisation remain unchanged.
More significant, at least for those outside the U.S., is what does not change. The main problem that non-U.S. actors have with the U.S. control over ICANN is that it can unilaterally interfere with the ICANN’s policy process, and the Internet’s root server (containing the authoritative root zone file). Post transition, it will no longer be able to do so with a direct fiat to ICANN. However, the numerous judicial, executive and legislative powers held by the U.S. government over ICANN as an American organisation remain unchanged.
The fear was never of the U.S. casually interfering with ICANN or the
root server. It is exceptional situations that remain a problem area.
The U.S. President has various kinds of emergency powers regarding key
infrastructure, which is likely to extend to ICANN and the root server.
Then there is the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which has seized
foreign assets in the U.S. on the flimsiest of geopolitical grounds. A
country’s domain name, like .in, in the root server can be considered as
its asset inside the U.S. It is also possible that the Federal
Communications Commission, having recently declared Internet service as a
public utility, might at will seek jurisdiction over ICANN-managed
critical Internet resources. And, of course, the U.S. legislature can
make any kind of law affecting any aspect of ICANN and the root server.
The greatest likelihood of the U.S. government’s interference comes from
the judiciary. A few adult content companies have legally challenged
the ICANN-mandated .xxx domain name. A U.S. court has taken the case on
file, thus exercising its jurisdiction over an ICANN policy decision. If
the court strikes down this decision, it will immediately unravel
ICANN’s pretensions of global legitimacy. With the new round of generic
top level domains (gTLDs) whereby every big company is encouraged to get
its own domain name, like .abcd, it is only a matter of time before a
U.S. court comes up with such a decision. Say, a U.S. pharmaceutical
company claims in a U.S. court that an Indian generic drug manufacturer
is infringing its patents globally, and therefore its assets, including
its gTLD, in the U.S., must be seized. The U.S. court, if it agrees, can
direct both ICANN to suspend the domain name and the root server
operator to delete it from the root file.
All in all, therefore, the real problem of the U.S.’s executive,
legislative and judicial control over ICANN and the root server will not
change with the current proposal. This is a serious matter. What is
required is to get ICANN incorporated under international law, with host
country immunities for an international organisation.
Jurisdiction issue
Despite strong exhortations by some of its members, the key question of jurisdiction over ICANN was not taken up by the group that developed the proposal. This issue has been moved to the second phase of this group, which could go on beyond the expected date of transition. This remains the main issue to resolve for any real change and progress. But the commitment of the U.S. government and other U.S. actors to consider any such change remains suspect. The U.S. government and the board repeatedly put up redlines whenever there were structural proposals that could ensure a greater latitude within the system to embrace change. And they succeeded at every point, because the so-called ‘community’ was eager to keep the U.S. government pleased, lest they simply refuse the transition altogether. This is hardly a democratic way of decision-making on such an important issue as ICANN’s new oversight mechanism. But the ‘community’ remains most interested to have power fully transferred to itself, even if within U.S.’s jurisdictional oversight, rather than go by larger global public interest concerns.
Despite strong exhortations by some of its members, the key question of jurisdiction over ICANN was not taken up by the group that developed the proposal. This issue has been moved to the second phase of this group, which could go on beyond the expected date of transition. This remains the main issue to resolve for any real change and progress. But the commitment of the U.S. government and other U.S. actors to consider any such change remains suspect. The U.S. government and the board repeatedly put up redlines whenever there were structural proposals that could ensure a greater latitude within the system to embrace change. And they succeeded at every point, because the so-called ‘community’ was eager to keep the U.S. government pleased, lest they simply refuse the transition altogether. This is hardly a democratic way of decision-making on such an important issue as ICANN’s new oversight mechanism. But the ‘community’ remains most interested to have power fully transferred to itself, even if within U.S.’s jurisdictional oversight, rather than go by larger global public interest concerns.
It is feared that before the U.S. government accepts the transition
proposal it will put in further safeguards against jurisdiction changes,
possible as a fundamental by-law for ICANN which is very difficult to
change. Or it could bring in a specific legislation in this regard, or
threaten one in case such a thing is ever attempted. This will nullify
all or any gain from the transition process.
That brings us to the last point, about what could have changed for the
worse. ICANN’s oversight will shift to a somewhat largish group that in
the first place elects the board, and has a narrow base. It is feared
that the concerned industry’s narrow interests will entirely take over,
with no restraints. The U.S. government at least had no reason to work
for these interests. (A few years back, it rapped ICANN on its knuckles
when it allowed .com owners to steeply raise domain name price, and got
it reversed.)
Unsure of its final status, ICANN has been cautious when governments,
especially the stronger ones, raised public policy issues, and mostly
chose to be accommodative (like in the .amazon and .wine cases). But
with an independent status finally settled, ICANN and its inbred
community is likely to get much more unabashed in its narrow
self-interest-based and commercial pursuits, disregarding global public
interest. What ICANN needs, therefore, apart from coming under
international jurisdiction, is some kind of external oversight, which,
however, need not be of governments.
(Parminder Jeet Singh works with the Bengaluru-based NGO, IT for
Change. He has been an adviser to the Chair of the United Nations
Internet Governance Forum. E-mail: parminder@itforchange.net)
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